Authorization

Protocol Revision: 2025-11-25

The Model Context Protocol provides authorization capabilities at the transport level, enabling MCP clients to make requests to restricted MCP servers on behalf of resource owners. This specification defines the authorization flow for HTTP-based transports.

Introduction

Purpose and Scope

Protocol Requirements

Authorization is OPTIONAL for MCP implementations. When supported:

Implementations using an HTTP-based transport SHOULD conform to this specification.
Implementations using an STDIO transport SHOULD NOT follow this specification, and instead retrieve credentials from the environment.
Implementations using alternative transports MUST follow established security best practices for their protocol.

Standards Compliance

This authorization mechanism is based on established specifications listed below, but implements a selected subset of their features to ensure security and interoperability while maintaining simplicity:

OAuth 2.1 IETF DRAFT (draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-13)
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata (RFC8414)
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol (RFC7591)
OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC9728)
OAuth Client ID Metadata Documents (draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00)

Roles

A protected MCP server acts as an OAuth 2.1 resource server, capable of accepting and responding to protected resource requests using access tokens.

An MCP client acts as an OAuth 2.1 client, making protected resource requests on behalf of a resource owner.

The authorization server is responsible for interacting with the user (if necessary) and issuing access tokens for use at the MCP server. The implementation details of the authorization server are beyond the scope of this specification. It may be hosted with the resource server or a separate entity. The Authorization Server Discovery section specifies how an MCP server indicates the location of its corresponding authorization server to a client.

Overview

Authorization servers MUST implement OAuth 2.1 with appropriate security measures for both confidential and public clients.
Authorization servers and MCP clients SHOULD support OAuth Client ID Metadata Documents (draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00).
Authorization servers and MCP clients MAY support the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol (RFC7591).
MCP servers MUST implement OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC9728). MCP clients MUST use OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata for authorization server discovery.
MCP authorization servers MUST provide at least one of the following discovery mechanisms:
- OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata (RFC8414)
- OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
MCP clients MUST support both discovery mechanisms to obtain the information required to interact with the authorization server.

Authorization Server Discovery

This section describes the mechanisms by which MCP servers advertise their associated authorization servers to MCP clients, as well as the discovery process through which MCP clients can determine authorization server endpoints and supported capabilities.

Authorization Server Location

MCP servers MUST implement the OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC9728) specification to indicate the locations of authorization servers. The Protected Resource Metadata document returned by the MCP server MUST include the authorization_servers field containing at least one authorization server.

The specific use of authorization_servers is beyond the scope of this specification; implementers should consult OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC9728) for guidance on implementation details.

Implementors should note that Protected Resource Metadata documents can define multiple authorization servers. The responsibility for selecting which authorization server to use lies with the MCP client, following the guidelines specified in RFC9728 Section 7.6 "Authorization Servers".

Protected Resource Metadata Discovery Requirements

MCP servers MUST implement one of the following discovery mechanisms to provide authorization server location information to MCP clients:

WWW-Authenticate Header: Include the resource metadata URL in the WWW-Authenticate HTTP header under resource_metadata when returning 401 Unauthorized responses, as described in RFC9728 Section 5.1.
Well-Known URI: Serve metadata at a well-known URI as specified in RFC9728. This can be either:
- At the path of the server's MCP endpoint: https://example.com/public/mcp could host metadata at https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/public/mcp
- At the root: https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource

MCP clients MUST support both discovery mechanisms and use the resource metadata URL from the parsed WWW-Authenticate headers when present; otherwise, they MUST fall back to constructing and requesting the well-known URIs in the order listed above.

MCP servers SHOULD include a scope parameter in the WWW-Authenticate header as defined in RFC 6750 Section 3 to indicate the scopes required for accessing the resource. This provides clients with immediate guidance on the appropriate scopes to request during authorization, following the principle of least privilege and preventing clients from requesting excessive permissions.

The scopes included in the WWW-Authenticate challenge MAY match scopes_supported, be a subset or superset of it, or an alternative collection that is neither a strict subset nor superset. Clients MUST NOT assume any particular set relationship between the challenged scope set and scopes_supported. Clients MUST treat the scopes provided in the challenge as authoritative for satisfying the current request. Servers SHOULD strive for consistency in how they construct scope sets but they are not required to surface every dynamically issued scope through scopes_supported.

Example 401 response with scope guidance:

        HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
        WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource",
                             scope="files:read"

MCP clients MUST be able to parse WWW-Authenticate headers and respond appropriately to HTTP 401 Unauthorized responses from the MCP server.

If the scope parameter is absent, clients SHOULD apply the fallback behavior defined in the Scope Selection Strategy section.

Authorization Server Metadata Discovery

To handle different issuer URL formats and ensure interoperability with both OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata and OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 specifications, MCP clients MUST attempt multiple well-known endpoints when discovering authorization server metadata.

The discovery approach is based on RFC8414 Section 3.1 "Authorization Server Metadata Request" for OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata discovery and RFC8414 Section 5 "Compatibility Notes" for OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 interoperability.

For issuer URLs with path components (e.g., https://auth.example.com/tenant1), clients MUST try endpoints in the following priority order:

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata with path insertion: https://auth.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1
OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 with path insertion: https://auth.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration/tenant1
OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 path appending: https://auth.example.com/tenant1/.well-known/openid-configuration

For issuer URLs without path components (e.g., https://auth.example.com), clients MUST try:

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata: https://auth.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0: https://auth.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration

Authorization Server Discovery Sequence Diagram

sequenceDiagram participant C as Client participant M as MCP Server (Resource Server) participant A as Authorization Server Note over C: Attempt unauthenticated MCP request C->>M: MCP request without token M-->>C: HTTP 401 Unauthorized (may include WWW-Authenticate header) alt Header includes resource_metadata Note over C: Extract resource_metadata URL from header C->>M: GET resource_metadata URI M-->>C: Resource metadata with authorization server URL else No resource_metadata in header Note over C: Fallback to well-known URI probing Note over M: _Not applicable if the MCP server is at the root_ C->>M: GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp alt Sub-path metadata found M-->>C: Resource metadata with authorization server URL else Sub-path not found C->>M: GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource alt Root metadata found M-->>C: Resource metadata with authorization server URL else Root metadata not found Note over C: Abort or use pre-configured values end end end Note over C: Validate RS metadata,
build AS metadata URL C->>A: GET Authorization server metadata endpoint Note over C,A: Try OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect
discovery endpoints in priority order A-->>C: Authorization server metadata Note over C,A: OAuth 1.1 authorization flow happens here C->>A: Token request A-->>C: Access token C->>M: MCP request with access token M-->>C: MCP response Note over C,M: MCP communication continues with valid token

Client Registration Approaches

MCP supports three client registration mechanisms. Choose based on your scenario:

Client ID Metadata Documents: When client and server have no prior relationship (most common)
Pre-registration: When client and server have an existing relationship
Dynamic Client Registration: For backwards compatibility or specific requirements

Clients supporting all options SHOULD follow the following priority order:

Use pre-registered client information for the server if the client has it available
Use Client ID Metadata Documents if the Authorization Server indicates if the server supports it (via client_id_metadata_document_supported in OAuth Authorization Server Metadata)
Use Dynamic Client Registration as a fallback if the Authorization Server supports it (via registration_endpoint in OAuth Authorization Server Metadata)
Prompt the user to enter the client information if no other option is available

Client ID Metadata Documents

MCP clients and authorization servers SHOULD support OAuth Client ID Metadata Documents as specified in OAuth Client ID Metadata Document. This approach enables clients to use HTTPS URLs as client identifiers, where the URL points to a JSON document containing client metadata. This addresses the common MCP scenario where servers and clients have no pre-existing relationship.

Implementation Requirements

MCP implementations supporting Client ID Metadata Documents MUST follow the requirements specified in OAuth Client ID Metadata Document. Key requirements include:

For MCP Clients:

Clients MUST host their metadata document at an HTTPS URL following RFC requirements
The client_id URL MUST use the "https" scheme and contain a path component, e.g. https://example.com/client.json
The metadata document MUST include at least the following properties: client_id, client_name, redirect_uris
Clients MUST ensure the client_id value in the metadata matches the document URL exactly
Clients MAY use private_key_jwt for client authentication (e.g., for requests to the token endpoint) with appropriate JWKS configuration as described in Section 6.2 of Client ID Metadata Document

For Authorization Servers:

SHOULD fetch metadata documents when encountering URL-formatted client_ids
MUST validate that the fetched document's client_id matches the URL exactly
SHOULD cache metadata respecting HTTP cache headers
MUST validate redirect URIs presented in an authorization request against those in the metadata document
MUST validate the document structure is valid JSON and contains required fields
SHOULD follow the security considerations in Section 6 of Client ID Metadata Document

Example Metadata Document

{
  "client_id": "https://app.example.com/oauth/client-metadata.json",
  "client_name": "Example MCP Client",
  "client_uri": "https://app.example.com",
  "logo_uri": "https://app.example.com/logo.png",
  "redirect_uris": [
    "http://127.0.0.1:3000/callback",
    "http://localhost:3000/callback"
  ],
  "grant_types": ["authorization_code"],
  "response_types": ["code"],
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "none"
}

Client ID Metadata Documents Flow

sequenceDiagram participant User participant Client as MCP Client participant Server as Authorization Server participant Metadata as Metadata Endpoint
(Client's HTTPS URL) participant Resource as MCP Server Note over Client,Metadata: Client hosts metadata at
https://app.example.com/oauth/metadata.json User->>Client: Initiates connection to MCP Server Client->>Server: Authorization Request
client_id=https://app.example.com/oauth/metadata.json
redirect_uri=http://localhost:3000/callback Server->>User: Authentication prompt User->>Server: Provides credentials Note over Server: Authenticates user Note over Server: Detects URL-formatted client_id Server->>Metadata: GET https://app.example.com/oauth/metadata.json Metadata-->>Server: JSON Metadata Document
{client_id, client_name, redirect_uris, ...} Note over Server: Validates:
1. client_id matches URL
2. redirect_uri in allowed list
3. Document structure valid
4. (Optional) Domain allowed via trust policy alt Validation Success Server->>User: Display consent page with client_name User->>Server: Approves access Server->>Client: Authorization code via redirect_uri Client->>Server: Exchange code for token
client_id=https://app.example.com/oauth/metadata.json Server-->>Client: Access token Client->>Resource: MCP requests with access token Resource-->>Client: MCP responses else Validation Failure Server->>User: Error response
error=invalid_client or invalid_request end Note over Server: Cache metadata for future requests
(respecting HTTP cache headers)

Discovery

Authorization servers advertise that they support clients using Client ID Metadata Documents by including the following property in their OAuth Authorization Server metadata:

{
  "client_id_metadata_document_supported": true
}

MCP clients SHOULD check for this capability and MAY fall back to Dynamic Client Registration or pre-registration if unavailable.

Preregistration

MCP clients SHOULD support an option for static client credentials such as those supplied by a preregistration flow. This could be:

Hardcode a client ID (and, if applicable, client credentials) specifically for the MCP client to use when interacting with that authorization server, or
Present a UI to users that allows them to enter these details, after registering an OAuth client themselves (e.g., through a configuration interface hosted by the server).

Dynamic Client Registration

MCP clients and authorization servers MAY support the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol RFC7591 to allow MCP clients to obtain OAuth client IDs without user interaction. This option is included for backwards compatibility with earlier versions of the MCP authorization spec.

Scope Selection Strategy

When implementing authorization flows, MCP clients SHOULD follow the principle of least privilege by requesting only the scopes necessary for their intended operations. During the initial authorization handshake, MCP clients SHOULD follow this priority order for scope selection:

Use scope parameter from the initial WWW-Authenticate header in the 401 response, if provided
If scope is not available, use all scopes defined in scopes_supported from the Protected Resource Metadata document, omitting the scope parameter if scopes_supported is undefined.

This approach accommodates the general-purpose nature of MCP clients, which typically lack domain-specific knowledge to make informed decisions about individual scope selection. Requesting all available scopes allows the authorization server and end-user to determine appropriate permissions during the consent process.

The scopes_supported field is intended to represent the minimal set of scopes necessary for basic functionality (see Scope Minimization), with additional scopes requested incrementally through the step-up authorization flow steps described in the Scope Challenge Handling section.

Authorization Flow Steps

sequenceDiagram participant B as User-Agent (Browser) participant C as Client participant M as MCP Server (Resource Server) participant A as Authorization Server C->>M: MCP request without token M->>C: HTTP 401 Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate header Note over C: Extract resource_metadata URL from WWW-Authenticate C->>M: Request Protected Resource Metadata M->>C: Return metadata Note over C: Parse metadata and extract authorization server(s)
Client determines AS to use C->>A: GET Authorization server metadata endpoint Note over C,A: Try OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect
discovery endpoints in priority order A-->>C: Authorization server metadata alt Client ID Metadata Documents Note over C: Client uses HTTPS URL as client_id Note over A: Server detects URL-formatted client_id A->>C: Fetch metadata from client_id URL C-->>A: JSON metadata document Note over A: Validate metadata and redirect_uris else Dynamic client registration C->>A: POST /register A->>C: Client Credentials else Pre-registered client Note over C: Use existing client_id end Note over C: Generate PKCE parameters
Include resource parameter
Apply scope selection strategy C->>B: Open browser with authorization URL + code_challenge + resource B->>A: Authorization request with resource parameter Note over A: User authorizes A->>B: Redirect to callback with authorization code B->>C: Authorization code callback C->>A: Token request + code_verifier + resource A->>C: Access token (+ refresh token) C->>M: MCP request with access token M-->>C: MCP response Note over C,M: MCP communication continues with valid token

Resource Parameter Implementation

MCP clients MUST implement Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0 as defined in RFC 8707 to explicitly specify the target resource for which the token is being requested. The resource parameter:

MUST be included in both authorization requests and token requests.
MUST identify the MCP server that the client intends to use the token with.
MUST use the canonical URI of the MCP server as defined in RFC 8707 Section 2.

Canonical Server URI

For the purposes of this specification, the canonical URI of an MCP server is defined as the resource identifier as specified in RFC 8707 Section 2 and aligns with the resource parameter in RFC 9728.

MCP clients SHOULD provide the most specific URI that they can for the MCP server they intend to access, following the guidance in RFC 8707. While the canonical form uses lowercase scheme and host components, implementations SHOULD accept uppercase scheme and host components for robustness and interoperability.

Examples of valid canonical URIs:

https://mcp.example.com/mcp
https://mcp.example.com
https://mcp.example.com:8443
https://mcp.example.com/server/mcp (when path component is necessary to identify individual MCP server)

Examples of invalid canonical URIs:

mcp.example.com (missing scheme)
https://mcp.example.com#fragment (contains fragment)

For example, if accessing an MCP server at https://mcp.example.com, the authorization request would include:

&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fmcp.example.com

MCP clients MUST send this parameter regardless of whether authorization servers support it.

Access Token Usage

Token Requirements

Access token handling when making requests to MCP servers MUST conform to the requirements defined in OAuth 2.1 Section 5 "Resource Requests". Specifically:

MCP client MUST use the Authorization request header field defined in OAuth 2.1 Section 5.1.1:
```
Authorization: Bearer <access-token>
      
```
Note that authorization MUST be included in every HTTP request from client to server, even if they are part of the same logical session.
Access tokens MUST NOT be included in the URI query string

Example request:

GET /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: mcp.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...

Token Handling

MCP servers, acting in their role as an OAuth 2.1 resource server, MUST validate access tokens as described in OAuth 2.1 Section 5.2. MCP servers MUST validate that access tokens were issued specifically for them as the intended audience, according to RFC 8707 Section 2. If validation fails, servers MUST respond according to OAuth 2.1 Section 5.3 error handling requirements. Invalid or expired tokens MUST receive a HTTP 401 response.

Error Handling

Servers MUST return appropriate HTTP status codes for authorization errors:

Status Code	Description	Usage
401	Unauthorized	Authorization required or token invalid
403	Forbidden	Invalid scopes or insufficient permissions
400	Bad Request	Malformed authorization request

Scope Challenge Handling

This section covers handling insufficient scope errors during runtime operations when a client already has a token but needs additional permissions. This follows the error handling patterns defined in OAuth 2.1 Section 5 and leverages the metadata fields from RFC 9728 (OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata).

Runtime Insufficient Scope Errors

When a client makes a request with an access token with insufficient scope during runtime operations, the server SHOULD respond with:

HTTP 403 Forbidden status code (per RFC 6750 Section 3.1)
WWW-Authenticate header with the Bearer scheme and additional parameters:
- error="insufficient_scope" - indicating the specific type of authorization failure
- scope="required_scope1 required_scope2" - specifying the minimum scopes needed for the operation
- resource_metadata - the URI of the Protected Resource Metadata document (for consistency with 401 responses)
- error_description (optional) - human-readable description of the error

Server Scope Management: When responding with insufficient scope errors, servers SHOULD include the scopes needed to satisfy the current request in the scope parameter.

Servers have flexibility in determining which scopes to include:

Minimum approach: Include the newly-required scopes for the specific operation. Include any existing granted scopes as well, if they are required, to prevent clients from losing previously granted permissions.
Recommended approach: Include both existing relevant scopes and newly required scopes to prevent clients from losing previously granted permissions.
Extended approach: Include existing scopes, newly required scopes, and related scopes that commonly work together.

The choice depends on the server's assessment of user experience impact and authorization friction.

Servers SHOULD be consistent in their scope inclusion strategy to provide predictable behavior for clients.

Servers SHOULD consider the user experience impact when determining which scopes to include in the response, as misconfigured scopes may require frequent user interaction.

Example insufficient scope response:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope",
                     scope="files:read files:write user:profile",
                     resource_metadata="https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource",
                     error_description="Additional file write permission required"

Step-Up Authorization Flow

Clients will receive scope-related errors during initial authorization or at runtime (insufficient_scope). Clients SHOULD respond to these errors by requesting a new access token with an increased set of scopes via a step-up authorization flow or handle the errors in other, appropriate ways. Clients acting on behalf of a user SHOULD attempt the step-up authorization flow. Clients acting on their own behalf (client_credentials clients) MAY attempt the step-up authorization flow or abort the request immediately.

The flow is as follows:

Parse error information from the authorization server response or WWW-Authenticate header
Determine required scopes as outlined in Scope Selection Strategy.
Initiate (re-)authorization with the determined scope set
Retry the original request with the new authorization no more than a few times and treat this as a permanent authorization failure

Clients SHOULD implement retry limits and SHOULD track scope upgrade attempts to avoid repeated failures for the same resource and operation combination.

Security Considerations

Implementations MUST follow OAuth 2.1 security best practices as laid out in OAuth 2.1 Section 7. "Security Considerations".

Token Audience Binding and Validation

RFC 8707 Resource Indicators provide critical security benefits by binding tokens to their intended audiences when the Authorization Server supports the capability. To enable current and future adoption:

MCP clients MUST include the resource parameter in authorization and token requests as specified in the Resource Parameter Implementation section
MCP servers MUST validate that tokens presented to them were specifically issued for their use

Token Theft

Attackers who obtain tokens stored by the client, or tokens cached or logged on the server can access protected resources with requests that appear legitimate to resource servers.

Clients and servers MUST implement secure token storage and follow OAuth best practices, as outlined in OAuth 2.1, Section 7.1.

Authorization servers SHOULD issue short-lived access tokens to reduce the impact of leaked tokens. For public clients, authorization servers MUST rotate refresh tokens as described in OAuth 2.1 Section 4.3.1 "Token Endpoint Extension".

Communication Security

Implementations MUST follow OAuth 2.1 Section 1.5 "Communication Security".

All authorization server endpoints MUST be served over HTTPS.
All redirect URIs MUST be either localhost or use HTTPS.

Authorization Code Protection

An attacker who has gained access to an authorization code contained in an authorization response can try to redeem the authorization code for an access token or otherwise make use of the authorization code. (Further described in OAuth 2.1 Section 7.5)

To mitigate this, MCP clients MUST implement PKCE according to OAuth 2.1 Section 7.5.2 and MUST verify PKCE support before proceeding with authorization. PKCE helps prevent authorization code interception and injection attacks by requiring clients to create a secret verifier-challenge pair, ensuring that only the original requestor can exchange an authorization code for tokens.

MCP clients MUST use the S256 code challenge method when technically capable, as required by OAuth 2.1 Section 4.1.1.

Since OAuth 2.1 and PKCE specifications do not define a mechanism for clients to discover PKCE support, MCP clients MUST rely on authorization server metadata to verify this capability:

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata: If code_challenge_methods_supported is absent, the authorization server does not support PKCE and MCP clients MUST refuse to proceed.
OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0: While the OpenID Provider Metadata does not define code_challenge_methods_supported, this field is commonly included by OpenID providers. MCP clients MUST verify the presence of code_challenge_methods_supported in the provider metadata response. If the field is absent, MCP clients MUST refuse to proceed.

Authorization servers providing OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 MUST include code_challenge_methods_supported in their metadata to ensure MCP compatibility.

Open Redirection

An attacker may craft malicious redirect URIs to direct users to phishing sites.

MCP clients MUST have redirect URIs registered with the authorization server.
Authorization servers MUST validate exact redirect URIs against pre-registered values to prevent redirection attacks.
MCP clients SHOULD use and verify state parameters in the authorization code flow and discard any results that do not include or have a mismatch with the original state.
Authorization servers MUST take precautions to prevent redirecting user agents to untrusted URI's, following suggestions laid out in OAuth 2.1 Section 7.12.2
Authorization servers SHOULD only automatically redirect the user agent if it trusts the redirection URI. If the URI is not trusted, the authorization server MAY inform the user and rely on the user to make the correct decision.

Client ID Metadata Document Security

When implementing Client ID Metadata Documents, authorization servers MUST consider the security implications detailed in OAuth Client ID Metadata Document, Section 6. Key considerations include:

Authorization Server Abuse Protection

The authorization server takes a URL as input from an unknown client and fetches that URL. A malicious client could use this to trigger the authorization server to make requests to arbitrary URLs, such as requests to private administration endpoints the authorization server has access to.

Authorization servers fetching metadata documents SHOULD consider Server‑Side Request Forgery (SSRF) risks, as described in OAuth Client ID Metadata Document: Server Side Request Forgery Attacks.

Localhost Redirect URI Risks

Client ID Metadata Documents cannot prevent localhost URL impersonation by themselves. An attacker can claim to be any client by:

Providing the legitimate client’s metadata URL as their client_id
Binding to any localhost port, and providing that address as the redirect_uri
Receiving the authorization code via the redirect when the user approves

The server will see the legitimate client’s metadata document and the user will see the legitimate client’s name, making attack detection difficult.

Authorization servers:

SHOULD display additional warnings for localhost-only redirect URIs
MAY require additional attestation mechanisms for enhanced security
MUST clearly display the redirect URI hostname during authorization

Trust Policies

Authorization servers MAY implement domain‑based trust policies:

Allowlists for trusted domains (for protected servers)
Accept any HTTPS client_id (for open servers)
Reputation checks for unknown domains
Restrictions based on domain age or certificate validation
Display the CIMD and other associated client hostnames prominently to prevent phishing

Confused Deputy Problem

Attackers can exploit MCP servers acting as intermediaries to third‑party APIs, leading to confused deputy vulnerabilities. By using stolen authorization codes, they can obtain access tokens without user consent.

MCP proxy servers using static client IDs MUST obtain user consent for each dynamically registered client before forwarding to third‑party authorization servers (which may require additional consent).

Access Token Privilege Restriction

An attacker can gain unauthorized access or otherwise compromise an MCP server if the server accepts tokens issued for other resources.

This vulnerability has two critical dimensions:

Audience validation failures. When an MCP server doesn’t verify that tokens were specifically intended for it (for example, via the audience claim, as mentioned in RFC 9068), it may accept tokens originally issued for other services. This breaks a fundamental OAuth security boundary, allowing attackers to reuse legitimate tokens across different services than intended.
Token passthrough. If the MCP server not only accepts tokens with incorrect audiences but also forwards these unmodified tokens to downstream services, it can potentially cause the ["confused deputy" problem](#confused-deputy-problem), where the downstream API may incorrectly trust the token as if it came from the MCP server or assume the token was validated by the upstream API. See the Token Passthrough section for additional details.

MCP servers MUST validate access tokens before processing the request, ensuring the access token is issued specifically for the MCP server, and take all necessary steps to ensure no data is returned to unauthorized parties.

A MCP server MUST follow the guidelines in OAuth 2.1 - Section 5.2 to validate inbound tokens.

MCP servers MUST only accept tokens specifically intended for themselves and MUST reject tokens that do not include them in the audience claim or otherwise verify that they are the intended recipient of the token. See the Security Best Practices Token Passthrough section for details.

If the MCP server makes requests to upstream APIs, it may act as an OAuth client to them. The access token used at the upstream API is a separate token, issued by the upstream authorization server. The MCP server MUST NOT pass through the token it received from the MCP client.

MCP clients MUST implement and use the resource parameter as defined in RFC 8707 - Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0 to explicitly specify the target resource for which the token is being requested. This requirement aligns with the recommendation in RFC 9728 Section 7.4. This ensures that access tokens are bound to their intended resources and cannot be misused across different services.

MCP Authorization Extensions

There are several authorization extensions to the core protocol that define additional authorization mechanisms. These extensions are:

Optional - Implementations can choose to adopt these extensions
Additive - Extensions do not modify or break core protocol functionality; they add new capabilities while preserving core protocol behavior
Composable - Extensions are modular and designed to work together without conflicts, allowing implementations to adopt multiple extensions simultaneously
Versioned independently - Extensions follow the core MCP versioning cycle but may adopt independent versioning as needed

A list of supported extensions can be found in the MCP Authorization Extensions repository.

Source: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization.md